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BALANCING INTERESTS UNDER WASHINGTON’S 
STATUTE GOVERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF 
EXTRANEOUS SEX-OFFENSE EVIDENCE 
Blythe Chandler 
Abstract: American courts traditionally exclude evidence that a defendant has committed 
crimes other than the crime with which the defendant is charged. This rule, with exceptions, 
is codified as Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and Washington Evidence Rule 404(b). 
However, courts and legislatures have increasingly adopted the view that evidence of other 
sex offenses should be admissible in sex-offense prosecutions. The Washington State 
Legislature recently adopted a statute, RCW 10.58.090, which governs the admissibility of 
evidence of other sex offenses. This Comment argues that Washington courts should use 
precedent applying Rule 404(b) as a guide in applying robust Rule 403 balancing under the 
new statute. This interpretation of the statute is consistent with its legislative history, 
preserves the traditional gate-keeping role of trial courts in evidence-admissibility 
determinations, and avoids a potential separation-of-powers question about which branch of 
government has ultimate authority over evidentiary rules in Washington. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Seventy-nine-year-old Roger Scherner was tried and convicted in 
King County Superior Court for molesting a relative when she was 
seven years old.1 Trial testimony revealed that Scherner had also 
molested other young girls, all of them either family members or 
daughters of family friends, over a period of several decades.2 In 
addition to the victim’s testimony, jurors heard four previous victims 
recount the abuse they had suffered as young girls.3 Their testimony was 
admitted under a new Washington evidence statute, section 10.58.090 of 
the Revised Code of Washington (RCW), which makes it easier for 
prosecutors to submit evidence of other sex offenses in sex-offense 
cases.4 
                                                     
1. Jennifer Sullivan, Abuse Sentence Took into Account Past Accusations, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 
4, 2008, at B1. State v. Scherner, No. 07-1-00355-6 (King County Superior Court, Aug. 21, 2008) 
(not reported), perfection of appeal No. 62507-1 (Nov. 3, 2008). 
2. Natalie Singer, Rape Trial Lets Family Share Decades of Pain, Secrets, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 
19, 2008, at A1. 
3. Sullivan, supra note 1. 
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.58.090 (2008); see also Natalie Singer, Past Abuse Acknowledged, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 21, 2008, at B1. 
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When a defendant is charged with a sex offense, the new law allows 
evidence of other sex offenses to be admitted, notwithstanding the 
traditional bar on extraneous offense evidence. Defense attorneys who 
observed Scherner’s trial said they expect the law will soon face 
challenges in Washington appellate courts.5 These challenges will likely 
question not only the applicability of the statute in cases where the 
evidence of other sex offenses is not as factually similar as it was in 
State v. Scherner, but also the Washington State Legislature’s authority 
to enact rules of evidence that conflict with judicial rules.6 
This Comment argues that Washington courts should interpret the 
new statute in a way that preserves the trial court’s traditional gate-
keeping role in evidence admissibility determinations. The statute 
requires trial courts to determine whether the probative value of 
evidence of other sex offenses is outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice under Rule 403.7 Washington courts should use the 
Washington State Supreme Court’s well-developed body of case law 
governing the admission of evidence of other sex offenses under Rule 
404(b) to guide Rule 403 balancing under the new statute. This 
interpretation respects the legislature’s judgment that evidence of other 
sex offenses is different than other types of propensity evidence. It is 
also consistent with the text and legislative history of the statute, and 
avoids difficult separation-of-powers questions about the authority of the 
legislature and judiciary to promulgate evidentiary rules. 
Part I of this Comment reviews the general bar on evidence of other 
offenses in American law and exceptions specific to sex-offense cases. 
Part II describes Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, which deal 
with sex-offense evidence in the federal courts, and analyzes the cases 
construing these rules. Part II also discusses similar evidentiary 
provisions enacted by states. Part III summarizes Washington law that 
addresses the respective powers of the Legislature and Judiciary to 
promulgate evidence rules. Part IV describes RCW 10.58.090 and 
summarizes its legislative history, while Part V describes the approach 
Washington courts have taken with regards to evidence of other sex 
                                                     
5. Singer, supra note 4. 
6. Scholar Karl B. Tegland, anticipating a challenge to the validity of RCW 10.58.090 wrote, 
“[t]he issue will come down to whether the legislature has the authority to mandate the admissibility 
of evidence that might otherwise be barred by a rule of evidence. Further litigation on this issue 
seems inevitable.” 5D KARL B. TEGLAND, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON WASHINGTON EVIDENCE 
246 (2008). 
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.58.090 (2008). 
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offenses under Rule 404(b). Finally, Part VI argues that Washington 
courts should use principles from their Rule 404(b) cases to guide their 
analysis under the new law, which ensures meaningful Rule 403 
balancing and avoids direct conflict with a court-promulgated rule. 
I.  COURTS HAVE MADE EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
TRADITIONAL PROHIBITION ON EVIDENCE OF OTHER 
BAD ACTS IN SEX-OFFENSE CASES 
The prohibition on evidence of other offenses committed by a 
criminal defendant is deeply rooted in Anglo-American jurisprudence.8 
This rule has created a presumption that such evidence is inadmissible 
despite the logical relevance of such evidence.9 The United States 
Supreme Court applied this rule in its 1892 decision in Boyd v. United 
States.10 The Court reversed the defendants’ convictions because the trial 
court admitted evidence that the defendants committed three robberies 
before the murder for which they were charged.11 The Court said, 
“However depraved in character, and however full of crime their past 
lives may have been, the defendants were entitled to be tried upon 
competent evidence, and only for the offence charged.”12 
Courts have excluded evidence of a defendant’s other offenses 
because they have long recognized that such evidence threatens the 
accuracy of trials. Jurors may give too much weight to such evidence 
and convict a defendant because they are convinced the defendant has a 
criminal character. Alternatively, jurors may convict a defendant as 
punishment for prior conduct, even if they are not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime charged.13 As 
Justice Jackson wrote for the U.S. Supreme Court in Michelson v. United 
States: 
The inquiry [into the defendant’s prior trouble with the law, 
                                                     
8. See 1A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2 (Tiller rev., 
1983). 
9. The presumption against admitting evidence of other crimes distinguishes Anglo-American 
evidence law from that of civil-law nations. Id. 
10. 142 U.S. 450 (1892). 
11. Id. at 458. 
12. Id. 
13. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Small Contribution to the Debate Over the Proposed Legislation 
Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
1125, 1137–38 (1993). 
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specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors] is not 
rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said 
to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as 
to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair 
opportunity to defend against a particular charge.14 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) codifies the ban on evidence of other 
wrongdoing, providing in part: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith.”15 Rule 404(b) includes several 
exceptions to that general rule, providing that such evidence “may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.”16 
Accusations of sexual misconduct are particularly likely to inspire 
strong negative reactions in jurors.17 Despite the prejudicial nature of 
evidence of other sex offenses, courts have not erected absolute bars to 
such evidence in sex-offense prosecutions. For example, state courts 
developed common-law “lustful disposition” exceptions for evidence of 
sexual misconduct with the same victim.18 The Washington State 
Supreme Court adopted such an exception in 1903 in State v. Wood.19 
Wood was an incest case; the trial judge had admitted testimony by the 
victim, the defendant’s daughter, about other acts of incest that occurred 
before the act for which he was charged.20 The state supreme court said, 
“[the] general rule undoubtedly is that evidence of a distinct and 
different offense from that for which the defendant is on trial is 
inadmissible.”21 However, the court held that this rule did not apply in 
                                                     
14. 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (internal citations omitted). 
15. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
16. Id. Washington Evidence Rule 404(b) contains identical provisions. WASH. R. EVID. 404(b). 
The majority of states have a rule that is similar or identical to Federal Evidence Rule 404(b). See 6 
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE, T-34–T-40 (Joseph M. 
McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed. 2008) (Table of State and Military Adaptations of Federal Rules of 
Evidence). 
17. See, e.g., State v. Saltarelli, 98 Wash. 2d 358, 363, 655 P.2d 697, 699 (1982) (“[W]eighing of 
potential prejudice against probative value is particularly important in sex cases, where the 
prejudice potential of prior acts is at its highest.”) (citing M. C. Slough & J. William Knightly, 
Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REV. 325, 333–34 (1956)). 
18. DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENCE OF OTHER MISCONDUCT AND SIMILAR 
EVENTS § 3.3.6 (2009). 
19. 33 Wash. 290, 74 P. 380 (1903). 
20. Id. at 291–92, 74 P. at 381. 
21. Id. at 291, 74 P. at 381. 
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“prosecutions for adultery, fornication, rape upon one under the age of 
consent, and incest,”22 where “acts of sexual intercourse occurring 
between the parties prior to the act charged in the information may be 
proved.”23 
Washington courts have also broadly construed the common-scheme 
or plan exception to Washington Evidence Rule 404(b) to allow 
evidence of other sex offenses in sex-offense prosecutions. The 
common-scheme or plan exception traditionally allowed evidence of 
offenses that were constituent parts of a larger criminal plan.24 For 
example, the theft of a getaway car would be admissible in a prosecution 
for a subsequent bank robbery. In State v. Lough, 25 the Washington 
State Supreme Court stated that this exception also applies when the 
defendant “devises a plan and uses it to perpetrate separate but very 
similar crimes.”26 The Lough court, approving the trial court’s admission 
of evidence that Lough had committed similar assaults before, affirmed 
his rape conviction.27 In recent years, Congress and a minority of state 
legislatures have codified rules permitting extraneous offense evidence 
in sex-offense cases. 
II.  IN 1994, CONGRESS CREATED NEW FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
RULES SPECIFIC TO SEX-OFFENSE EVIDENCE AND SOME 
STATES HAVE ADOPTED SIMILAR RULES 
In 1994, the U.S. Congress enacted new Federal Rules of Evidence 
that deal exclusively with sex-offense evidence—over the objection of 
the federal judiciary.28 Rule 413 applies to evidence of other acts of 
                                                     
22. Id. at 292, 74 P. at 381. 
23. Id. 
24. See State v. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d 847, 854–55, 889 P.2d 487, 491 (1995); see also ROBERT 
H. ARONSON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN WASHINGTON § 404.05[2][d][iv] (2008). 
25. 125 Wash. 2d 847, 889 P.2d 487 (1995). 
26. Id. at 855, 889 P.2d at 491. 
27. Id. at 852–53, 889 P.2d at 490. 
28. The Judicial Conference of the United States objected to the rules on a number of grounds, 
including the concerns about “the danger of convicting a criminal defendant for past, as opposed to 
charged, behavior or for being a bad person.” Report of the Judicial Conference on the Admission 
of Character Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct Cases, 159 F.R.D. 51, 53 (1995). Congress 
enacted the original Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-
595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). However, “Congress bypassed the ordinary rulemaking procedures” and 
developed Rules 413 and 414 with limited input from the judiciary. Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 
283 F.3d 138, 151 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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sexual assault in prosecutions for sexual assault,29 and Rule 414 governs 
evidence of other acts of child molestation in prosecutions for child 
molestation.30 Rules 413 and 414 provide that “evidence of the 
defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault 
[or child molestation] is admissible, and may be considered for its 
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”31 Federal circuit courts 
have upheld the rules against both equal-protection and due-process 
challenges.32 
Before admitting evidence of other offenses, federal courts evaluate 
the strength of that evidence. Under Huddleston v. United States,33 
federal courts consider extraneous offense evidence under Rule 104(b), 
which requires only that a reasonable fact-finder could find that the 
extraneous act occurred.34 Circuit courts have applied this rule to 
preliminary admissibility determinations under Rules 413 and 414.35 
Federal courts have held that Rule 403 applies to evidence offered 
under Rules 413 and 414, but with less force than to evidence offered 
under other rules. Neither Rule 413 nor Rule 414 mentions Rule 403 
balancing.36 Yet, in United States v. LeCompte,37 where the defendant 
was charged with molesting his niece, the district court applied Rule 403 
                                                     
29. FED. R. EVID. 413. 
30. Id. 414. Congress also adopted Rule 415, which governs the admissibility of other sex-offense 
evidence in civil cases. Id. 415. 
31. Id. 413(a); id. 414(a). 
32. See, eg., United States v. Julian, 427 F.3d 471, 487 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. LeMay, 
260 F.3d 1018, 1024–31 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1430–34 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Castillo, 
140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in cases involving 
admission of evidence under Rules 413 and 414. This Comment assumes that Washington’s new 
evidence statute would also survive federal-constitutional review. Analogous potential state-
constitutional challenges are also outside the scope of this Comment. 
33. 485 U.S. 681 (1988). 
34. Id. at 689–90. Washington courts take a stronger view of the judiciary’s gate-keeping function 
and evaluate such evidence under Rule 104(a), which requires that a prosecutor establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the alleged other act occurred. See infra note 147 and 
accompanying text. 
35. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433. For a more complete discussion of this issue see Johnson v. Elk 
Lake School District, 283 F.3d 138, 155 (3d Cir. 2002). 
36. FED. R. EVID. 413; id. 414. There was initially doubt among commentators and courts about 
whether Rule 403 balancing applied to Rules 413 and 414. See, e.g., United States v. Sumner, 119 
F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing district court ruling against admission of evidence under 
Rule 414 based on conclusion that the Rule is unconstitutional in part because it did not allow “for 
the application of the Rule 403 balancing test”). 
37. 131 F.3d 767 (1997). 
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to exclude testimony by a second niece that he had molested her as 
well.38 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The circuit court 
acknowledged that Rule 403 applies, but held that the district court 
abused its discretion by excluding the evidence, based on “the strong 
legislative judgment that the evidence of prior sexual offenses should 
ordinarily be admissible.”39 The Tenth Circuit agreed, asserting that 
“exclusion of relevant evidence [of other sex offenses] under Rule 403 
should be used infrequently, reflecting Congress’ legislative judgment 
that the evidence ‘normally’ should be admitted.”40 
Commentators have criticized the way that federal courts have 
applied Rules 413 and 414. Professor Aviva Orenstein characterizes the 
Rule 403 balancing test that federal courts have applied to evidence 
offered under Rules 413 and 414 as “toothless and ineffectual.”41 
Professor Rosanna Cavallaro describes the federal courts as applying a 
“diluted” version of Rule 403.42 She argues that admission of evidence 
under Rules 413 and 414 should be “constrained by a robust application 
of Rule 403.”43 
A handful of states have adopted rules similar to Rules 413 and 414. 
Alaska,44 Arizona,45 California,46 Florida,47 Illinois,48 Iowa,49 
Louisiana,50 and Missouri51 have rules specifically permitting the 
admission of some evidence of other sex offenses in sex-offense 
                                                     
38. Id. at 768–69. 
39. Id. at 769. 
40. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433. 
41. Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rules of 
Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487, 1491 (2005). 
42. Rosanna Cavallaro, Federal Rules of Evidence 413–415 and the Struggle for Rulemaking 
Preeminence, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31, 69 (2007). 
43. Id. at 70. 
44. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(2)–(3). 
45. ARIZ. R. EVID. 404(c). 
46. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West Supp. 2009). 
47. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2) (West Supp. 2009) (allowing for admission of evidence of prior 
acts of child molestation when a defendant is charged with child molestation). 
48. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-7.3 (West 2008). 
49. IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.11 (West Supp. 2008). 
50. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 412.2 (2006) (only applies to prosecutions for sexual misconduct 
with a victim under the age of seventeen). 
51. MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.025 (West 1999 & Supp. 2009). This statute was held unconstitutional 
in State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603 (Mo. 2007). 
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prosecutions.52 State high courts have generally upheld these rules 
against constitutional challenge, although Missouri53 has struck down its 
rule and Florida54 has limited the scope of its rule. In 2008, Washington 
joined the states that have codified a rule specific to sex-offense 
evidence in sex-offense prosecutions, with the enactment of RCW 
10.58.090. 
III. BOTH THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE AND 
SUPREME COURT HAVE ASSERTED THE POWER TO 
CREATE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The Washington State Legislature’s enactment of RCW 10.58.090 
was unusual because the Washington State Supreme Court has 
promulgated most Washington evidence rules. Whether the legislature or 
the judiciary has ultimate authority over evidence rules, and which rule 
governs if the two bodies promulgate conflicting rules, are unresolved 
questions in Washington. 
A. The Washington State Supreme Court Initially Adopted the
 Washington Rules of Evidence 
The Washington State Supreme Court adopted the Washington 
Evidence Rules by court order in 1978,55 after Chief Justice Stafford 
                                                     
52. Oregon Evidence Rule 404(4) makes evidence of “other crimes, wrongs or acts” committed 
by the defendant admissible if relevant, except as otherwise provided by other evidence rules, or 
required by the Oregon or United States Constitution. OR. REV. STAT. § 40.170 (2001). Oregon 
courts of appeals have interpreted this rule as prohibiting Rule 403 balancing of evidence of other 
offenses that is offered for a non-propensity purpose unless such balancing is required by due 
process. See, e.g., State v. Wyant, 175 P.3d 988, 991 (Or. Ct. App. 2007). This statute does not 
create a special rule for sex-offense evidence. Texas has a rule that allows evidence of other 
“crimes, wrongs or acts committed by the defendant” against the same child who is the victim of the 
charged offense. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008). 
53. Missouri is a notable exception. The state supreme court in State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603, 
608 (Mo. 2007), struck down Missouri’s statute as unconstitutional on the grounds that evidence of 
the defendant’s prior criminal acts admitted purely to show propensity “violates one of the 
constitutional protections vital to the integrity of our criminal justice system.” 
54. See McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1262 (Fla. 2006) (extending precedent to Florida’s 
rule governing evidence of other sex offenses and requiring: (1) the trial court to find the other 
offenses have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, (2) the trial court to use factors 
including “the similarity of the prior acts to the act charged regarding the location of where the acts 
occurred, the age and gender of the victims, and the manner in which the acts were committed,” and 
(3) the trial court to guard against allowing testimony regarding other offenses becoming a “feature 
of the trial”). 
55. Adoption of Rules of Evidence, 91 Wash. 2d 1117 (1978). 
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appointed a Judicial Council Task Force to study whether or not 
Washington should adopt written evidence rules.56 The members of the 
Task Force discussed whether the rules should be created by statute or 
court rule,57 and ultimately opted for court rule, grounding their decision 
in the judiciary’s inherent constitutional powers.58 The Task Force 
recommended that Washington adopt a set of rules based on (but not 
identical to) the Federal Rules.59 The judiciary has generally overseen 
amendments to the Washington Rules of Evidence since then.60 
B.  Washington Case Law Provides No Clear Answers as to Which 
Branch of the Government Has Ultimate Authority over Evidence 
Rules 
The Washington State Supreme Court has determined that article IV, 
section 1 of the state constitution61 gives it the inherent authority to 
create rules of court procedure.62 The court’s authority to create rules is 
also recognized in the Revised Code of Washington: 
The supreme court shall have the power to prescribe, from time 
to time, . . . the mode and manner . . . of taking and obtaining 
evidence, . . . and generally to regulate and prescribe by rule the 
forms for and the kind and character of the entire pleading, 
practice and procedure to be used in all suits . . . by the supreme 
court, superior courts, and district courts of the state . . . to 
                                                     
56. Karl B. Tegland, The Proposed Rules of Evidence: An Opportunity for Codification, WASH. 
STATE BAR NEWS, Jan. 1979, at 28, 28. Mr. Tegland served as the reporter for Judicial Council Task 
Force. Id. 
57. Id. at 30–31. 
58. See WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Tegland, supra note 56, at 30–31. 
59. Tegland, supra note 56, at 28. 
60. The Washington State Supreme Court adopts new court rules under a process described in 
General Rule 9. General Rule 9 states that any person or group may propose an amendment to the 
court rules or a new court rule and describes the form such submissions should take. WASH. CT. R. 
9(c) & (d). General Rule 9 also describes the court’s process for reviewing such rules, which 
includes a public comment period for any rules making “significant” (meaning non-technical) 
changes. Id. 9(f) & (g). It also provides a schedule for proposal, consideration, and adoption of new 
rules. 
61. Article IV, § 1 provides, “[t]he judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, 
superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as the legislature may provide.” 
WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
62. State v. Fields, 85 Wash. 2d 126, 129, 530 P.2d 284, 285–86 (1975) (holding that art. IV, § 1 
gave the court such inherent power “quite apart” from statutory authority and that this power 
included the ability to enact criminal rules authorizing the issuance of a search warrant because 
issuance of a search warrant is part of criminal process). 
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promote the speedy determination of litigation on the merits.63 
Nonetheless, the court has acknowledged the legislature’s authority to 
create rules of evidence. In State v. Sears,64 the court said in dictum that 
the legislature has the power to enact rules of evidence.65 The trial court 
had entered judgment against Sears for five violations of the Unfair 
Practices Act.66 Sears argued on appeal that the Act violated provisions 
of both the state and federal constitutions, and that various terms used in 
the Act, including the term “cost survey,” were too vague and uncertain 
to be sustained.67 The Act provided that a “cost survey,” established by 
the defendant’s trade or industry “shall be deemed competent evidence 
to be used in proving” a violation.68 The court rejected Sears’ argument: 
“It may be admitted that the term ‘cost survey’ is not as definite as it 
might be . . . . It is also apparent that all the statute does, or was 
intended to do, is to create a rule of evidence, which of course the 
legislature may do.”69 
The court has also said that the legislature has authority over 
“substantive law,”70 and has made a qualified statement that rules of 
evidence are substantive law.71 In State v. Pavelich,72 the defendants had 
been convicted of operating a speakeasy.73 Pavelich appealed on the 
grounds that the trial court had erred by failing to give an instruction that 
no inference of guilt could be drawn from the defendants’ decision not to 
testify in the case.74 Pavelich had not requested the instruction.75 A 
                                                     
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.190 (2008). 
64. 4 Wash. 2d 200, 103 P.2d 337 (1940). 
65. Id. at 215, 103 P.2d at 344. 
66. Id. at 203, 103 P.2d at 339. The trial court had entered a judgment on the pleadings in favor of 
the plaintiff after the defendant demurred to the complaint, arguing that it failed to state a cause of 
action. When the trial court overruled the demurrer, the defendant opted to stand on his demurrer. 
See also Unfair Practices Act, 1939 Wash. Sess. Laws 923 (regulating unfair business practices). 
67. Sears, 4 Wash. 2d at 208–10, 103 P.2d at 341–42. 
68. Id. at 214, 103 P.2d at 344; 1939 Wash. Sess. Laws at 927–28. 
69. Sears, 4 Wash. 2d at 214–15, 103 P.2d at 344 (emphasis added). For a similar statement that 
the state may create a cause of action and include in the law provisions regarding evidence, see 
Folden v. Robinson, 58 Wash. 2d 760, 766, 364 P.2d 924, 928 (1961). 
70. The court has said that the legislature has authority over “substantive law” and the court has 
authority over “procedural law.” Emright v. King County, 96 Wash. 2d 538, 540, 637 P.2d 656, 658 
(1981). 
71. State v. Pavelich, 153 Wash. 379, 380, 279 P. 1102, 1102 (1929). 
72. Id. at 379, 279 P. at 1102. 
73. Id. at 380, 279 P. at 1102. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
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statute made it “the duty of the court to instruct the jury that no inference 
of guilt shall arise” against a defendant who does not testify,76 which 
courts had interpreted to require such an instruction even if the 
defendant did not ask for it.77 A court rule abrogated the requirement that 
courts give the instruction without a request by the defendant.78 While 
holding that Pavelich’s failure to request an instruction defeated his 
claim, the court said, “Rules of evidence are substantive law, found in 
the common law chiefly, and growing out of the reasoning, experience, 
and common sense of lawyers and courts.”79 
The court described itself as the final arbiter of evidentiary rules in a 
case dealing with an evidence rule created by the legislature. In State v. 
Ryan,80 the defendant appealed his conviction for committing indecent 
liberties with two children, objecting to hearsay statements by both 
victims that were admitted under a child-hearsay statute.81 The defendant 
argued that the legislature had violated the separation-of-powers doctrine 
by invading the judicial province.82 The court’s discussion of the 
separation-of-powers issue contains assertions of judicial authority over 
evidence rules: 
Where a rule of court is inconsistent with a procedural statute, 
the court’s rulemaking power is supreme. Nonetheless, apparent 
conflicts between a court rule and a statutory provision should 
be harmonized, and both given effect if possible.  
Legislative enactment of hearsay exceptions is specifically 
contemplated by the Rules of Evidence. [Rule] 802 states: 
“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, by 
other court rules, or by statute.” Nevertheless, statutory 
enactments of evidentiary rules are subject to judicial review, 
this court being the final arbiter of evidentiary rules.83 
                                                     
76. Wash. Rem. & Bal. Code § 2148 (1915). 
77. Pavelich, 153 Wash. at 385–86, 279 P. at 1104 (citing Linbeck v. State, 1 Wash. 336, 25 P. 
452 (1890), reaff’d, State v. Meyers, 8 Wash. 177, 35 P. 580 (1894)). 
78. Pavelich, 153 Wash. at 386, 279 P. at 1104–05. The court rule at issue was Rule 9. 140 Wash. 
xli (1926). 
79. Pavelich, 153 Wash. at 382, 279 P. at 1103 (emphasis added). 
80. 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984). Ryan was decided after the court codified the 
Washington Rules of Evidence. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
81. Id. at 167, 691 P.2d 197. The child hearsay statute at issue in Ryan was WASH. REV. CODE § 
9A.44.120 (1983). 
82. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d at 169, 691 P.2d at 201. 
83. Id. at 178, 691 P.2d at 206 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
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However, the court interpreted the statute to include the constitutional 
requirements under the Confrontation Clause of “unavailability”84 of the 
declarant and “reliability” of the statement.85 The court held that the 
admission of the hearsay testimony was improper because neither 
requirement was met.86 
The court’s interpretation of the child-hearsay statute allowed it to 
avoid the issue of whether the legislature has the power to enact an 
evidentiary rule that is inconsistent with one created by the judiciary. 
The court reversed Ryan’s conviction because, other than his confession, 
the hearsay statements were the only evidence that a crime had occurred. 
Without the hearsay statements there was insufficient evidence to sustain 
a conviction under the corpus delicti rule.87 
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF RCW 10.58.090 
EMPHASIZES RULE 403 AND RETREATS FROM THE 
FEDERAL RULES AND ASSERTIONS OF LEGISLATIVE 
POWER 
RCW 10.58.090, which the Washington State Legislature adopted 
with near unanimity,88 provides: “In a criminal action in which the 
defendant is accused of a sex offense, evidence of the defendant’s 
commission of another sex offense or sex offenses is admissible, 
notwithstanding Evidence Rule 404(b), if the evidence is not 
inadmissible pursuant to Evidence Rule 403.”89 “Sex offense” is defined 
by other provisions of the Washington Code,90 and expressly includes 
                                                     
84. Id. at 170, 691 P.2d at 202. 
85. Id. at 170, 691 P.2d at 202. 
86. Id. at 170–77, 691 P.2d 202–06 (applying the constitutional rule of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
56 (1980)). 
87. Id. at 178, 691 P.2d at 206. Under Washington’s corpus delecti rule, a conviction cannot be 
sustained on the basis of the defendant’s confession alone; some additional corroborative evidence 
is required. Id. at 177–78, 691 P.2d at 206. 
88. Substitute Senate Bill 6933 passed the Senate by a vote of 47-0 and passed the House by a 
vote of 91-5. Certification of Enrollment, Sub. S. 6933, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008), 
available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2007-08/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Passed 
%20Legislature/6933-S.PL.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/ 
wlr/notes/84washlrev259n88.pdf. 
89. Sex Offenses—Admissibility of Evidence, ch. 90, 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 412. 
90. Section 4 of the statute provides: “For purposes of this section, ‘sex offense’ means: Any 
offense defined as a sex offense under RCW 9.94A.030; Any violation under RCW 9A.44.096 
(sexual misconduct with a minor in the second degree; and Any violation under RCW 9.68A.090 
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uncharged conduct.91 The definition encompasses many different 
offenses, including rape in the first, second, or third degree;92 rape of a 
child in the first, second, or third degree;93 child molestation in the first, 
second, or third degree;94 sexual misconduct with a minor in the first or 
second degree;95 indecent liberties;96 sexually violating human 
remains;97 voyeurism;98 custodial sexual misconduct in the first degree;99 
criminal trespass against children;100 incest in the first or second 
degree;101 sexual exploitation of a minor;102 dealing in depictions of a 
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct;103 sending or bringing into 
state depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct;104 
possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct;105 communication with a minor for immoral purposes;106 
commercial sexual abuse of a minor;107 and criminal attempt, criminal 
solicitation, or criminal conspiracy to commit any of the included 
crimes.108 
The statute instructs courts to weigh a variety of factors when 
deciding whether evidence that a defendant has committed another sex 
offense is admissible under Rule 403: 
                                                     
(communication with a minor for immoral purposes).” Id. § 10.58.090(4). A conviction under 
another state’s law, or under federal law, for conduct that would constitute a Washington “sex 
offense” is included within the definition. Id. § 9.94A.030(46)(d) (including in the definition of sex 
offense “[a]ny federal or out-of-state conviction for an offense that under the laws of this state 
would be a felony classified as a sex offense under (a) of this subsection”). 
91. Id. § 10.58.090(5). 
92. Id. §§ 9A.44.040, 9A.44.050, 9A.44.060. 
93. Id. §§ 9A.44.073–079. 
94. Id. §§ 9A.44.083–089. 
95. Id. §§ 9A.44.093–096. 
96. Id. § 9A.44.100. 
97. Id. § 9A.44.105. 
98. Id. § 9A.44.115. 
99. Id. § 9A.44.160. 
100. Id. § 9A.44.196. 
101. Id. § 9A.64.020. 
102. Id. § 9.68A.040. 
103. Id. § 9.68A.050. 
104. Id. § 9.68A.060. 
105. Id. § 9.68A.070. 
106. Id. § 9.68A.090. 
107. Id. § 9.68A.100. 
108. Id. § 9A.28. 
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(a) The similarity of the prior acts to the acts charged;109 
(b) The closeness in time of the prior acts to the acts charged; 
(c) The frequency of the prior acts; 
(d) The presence or lack of intervening circumstances; 
(e) The necessity of the evidence beyond the testimonies already 
offered at trial;110 
(f) Whether the prior act was a criminal conviction;111 
(g) Whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence; and 
(h) Other facts and circumstances.112 
Factor (g) contains language identical to the language of Rule 403.113 
The statute does not provide any guidance as to how courts should weigh 
the eight factors, and does not address what courts should do when some 
factors point toward admission while others point toward exclusion.114 
                                                     
109. This reference to “prior” acts may be inconsistent with the statute’s provision that evidence 
of the defendant’s commission of “another sex offense or sex offenses” is admissible under the 
statute. Id. § 10.58.090(1) (emphasis added). The difference between “another sex offense” and 
“prior acts” is significant: in United States v. Sioux, the Ninth Circuit upheld the admission of 
evidence of the defendant’s acts committed after the charged crime, in part because Federal 
Evidence Rules 413 and 414 both refer to evidence of “another offense or offenses.” 362 F.3d 1241, 
1245 (9th Cir. 2004). 
110. Factors (a)–(e) mirror the language of the factors that the Ninth Circuit instructed trial courts 
to consider when determining the admissibility of evidence under Federal Evidence Rules 413–15. 
See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001); Doe by Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 
232 F.3d 1258, 1268 (9th Cir. 2000). Some of these factors are also similar to factors that the 
Judicial Conference of the United States included in a proposed alternative to Rules 413–15. Report 
of the Judicial Conference on the Admission of Character Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct 
Cases, 159 F.R.D. 51, 54–55 (1995). 
111. Although the statute specifically includes “uncharged” conduct in the definition of sex 
offense, it is unclear whether conduct for which the defendant has been acquitted may be admitted. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that evidence of acts for which a defendant has been acquitted is 
not necessarily barred in a subsequent prosecution because of double jeopardy. United States v. 
Dowling, 493 U.S. 342, 348 (1990). Washington cases are in accord. See, e.g., State v. Eggleston, 
164 Wash. 2d 61, 187 P.3d 233 (2008). 
112. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.58.090(6) (2008). 
113. Rule 403 reads: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.” WASH. R. EVID. 403. 
114. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.58.090. 
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However, three patterns in the legislative history of the statute are useful 
in interpreting the statute. Specifically, the legislature removed 
references to Federal Evidence Rules 413 and 414, emphasized the 
importance of Rule 403 balancing, and moderated assertions of 
legislative power over the evidence rules. 
A. The Legislative History of RCW 10.58.090 Shows the Legislature’s 
Movement Away from Federal Rules 413 and 414 and Toward 
Rule 403 Balancing 
The Washington State Legislature considered and abandoned a pair of 
draft bills governing sex-offense evidence, then introduced a new bill,115 
which was further amended before adoption in 2008.116 The textual 
differences between these subsequent drafts of the bill that eventually 
became RCW 10.58.090 provide insight into the legislature’s intent in 
adopting the statute.117 
The two draft bills contained a section expressly stating that the new 
law was “based upon Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, and 
federal appellate court cases construing those rules.”118 As passed, the 
statute does not contain a single reference to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, or the cases interpreting them.119 In fact, the legislative history 
                                                     
115. S. 6933, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (First Reading, Feb. 7, 2008) (Wash. 2008). 
116. Senate Bill 6933 was replaced with Substitute Senate Bill 6933, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. 
(First Reading Feb. 8, 2008), which was amended twice. 6933-S AMH JUDI ZARO 021 (adopted 
Mar. 5, 2008), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2007-
08/Pdf/Amendments/House/6933-S%20AMH%20JUDI%20ZARO%20021.pdf, permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev259n116a.pdf; 6933-S AMH 
JUDI ZARO 019 (adopted Mar. 5, 2008), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2007-08/Pdf/Amendments/House/6933-
S%20AMH%20JUDI%20ZARO%20019.pdf, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev259n116b.pdf. 
117. The Washington State Supreme Court has used subsequent drafts of legislation to determine 
legislative intent. See, e.g., In re the Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wash. 2d 795, 804–08, 854 P.2d 629, 
634–36 (1993). 
118. S. 6363 § 3(1), 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008); H.R. 2622 § 3(1), 60th Leg., 2008 
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008). 
119. Compare S. 6363, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (First Reading, Feb. 7, 2008) (Wash. 2008), 
H.R. 2622 § 2(8) (Wash. 2008) with Sex Offenses—Admissibility of Evidence, ch. 90, 2008 Wash. 
Sess. Laws 412. See also, 6933-S AMH JUDI ZARO 021 (adopted Mar. 5, 2008), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2007-08/Pdf/Amendments/House/6933-
S%20AMH%20JUDI%20ZARO%20021.pdf, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev259n119.pdf (amending the Substitute S. 
6933 to remove references to the Federal Rules of Evidence and cases construing them). The Final 
Bill Report does retain a minor reference to Federal Rules 413 and 414 and states that there are 
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of the statute suggests that legislators preferred to leave its interpretation 
to Washington courts. House Judiciary Committee Chairwoman Pat 
Lantz said references to the Federal Rules and cases construing them 
were not needed because the state supreme court has its own way of 
deciding when federal rules and decisions are “germane.”120 
Unlike Federal Evidence Rules 413 and 414, the draft bills required 
the application of Rule 403 to evidence offered under the statute.121 
However, the draft bills significantly limited a trial court’s discretion 
under Rule 403 by providing that “[t]he inflammatory potential inherent 
in the sexual nature of prior sex offenses cannot be considered in 
evaluating the admissibility of evidence under this section.”122 This 
language never appeared in the new bill.123 Legislators provided a list of 
factors that courts must consider when performing the Rule 403 
balancing test but left trial courts free to determine the potential for 
prejudice associated with the introduction of evidence of other sex 
offenses.124 
B.  The Legislature Replaced Broad Assertions of Legislative Power to 
Enact Evidence Rules in the Draft Bills with More Moderate 
Statements in the Final Statute 
Textual differences between draft bills and the bill that the legislature 
finally adopted, as well as statements by legislators and members of the 
judiciary, demonstrate that the legislature was concerned about intruding 
on the power of the judiciary when they adopted the bill. The draft bills 
asserted, “It is now apparent that with respect to substantive rules of 
evidence related to criminal proceedings, the legislative process is better 
suited to address concerns raised by the general public than is the court 
                                                     
federal appellate court cases construing the rules. Sub. S. 6933, Final Bill Report, at 1 (2008), 
available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2007-
08/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/Senate%20Final/6933-S.FBR.pdf, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev259n119.pdf. 
120. Executive Session on S. 6933, H. Judiciary Comm., 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Feb. 28, 
2008) (statement of Rep. Pat Lantz in support of amendment 6933-S AMH JUDI ZARO 021), 
available at 
http://www.tvw.org/media/mediaplayer.cfm?evid=2008021272&TYPE=V&CFID=1185621&CFT
OKEN=93536292&bhcp=1 at 1:02:00. 
121. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; S. 6363 § 1, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 
2008); H.R. 2622 § 1, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008). 
122. Id. 
123. S. 6933, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (First Reading, Feb. 7, 2008) (Wash. 2008). 
124. See Sex Offenses—Admissibility of Evidence, ch. 90, 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 412. 
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rule process.”125 The draft bills cited State v. Sears126 and State v. 
Pavelich127 as legal authority for the proposition that the legislature’s 
authority extends to enacting rules of evidence because the Court has 
categorized rules of evidence as substantive law.128 The draft bills also 
would have amended RCW 2.04.200, which provides that “[w]hen and 
as the rules of courts herein authorized shall be promulgated all laws in 
conflict therewith shall be and become of no further force or effect,”129 
by adding a single clause: “unless the law in conflict expressly states an 
intent to supercede a rule of court.”130 Subsequent drafts of the bill show 
the legislature retreating from absolute statements of legislative authority 
to create evidence rules. 
It is likely that at least one reason for this change was the Washington 
legal establishment’s opposition to Senate Bill 6933. Distinguished 
members of the legal community argued that the legislature should defer 
to the court’s rule-making process to address the issue of evidence of 
other sex offenses.131 Chief Justice Gerry Alexander wrote a letter to the 
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, asking that the matter be 
left to the courts: 
While the substitute bill [SB 6933] represents an improvement 
over the original legislation, SB 6363, the judiciary remains very 
concerned with moving this legislation forward without a 
broader conversation. This is a very controversial issue, with 
strong opinions on both sides of the argument, and we strongly 
feel that the appropriate avenue for a discussion of this nature is 
                                                     
125. S. 6363 § 1, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008); H.R. 2622 § 1, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. 
Sess. (Wash. 2008). 
126. 4 Wash. 2d 200, 103 P.2d 337 (1940). See supra Part III. 
127. 153 Wash. 379, 279 P. 1102 (1929). See supra Part III. 
128. S. 6363 § 1, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008); H.R. 2622 § 1, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. 
Sess. (Wash. 2008) (“The legislature’s authority for enacting rules of evidence arises from the 
Washington supreme court’s prior classification of such rules as substantive law. See State v. Sears, 
4 [Wash.] 2d 200, 215, 103 P.2d 337 (1940) (the legislature has the power to enact laws which 
create rules of evidence); State v. Pavelich, 153 Wash. 379, 279 P. 1102 (1929) (‘rules of evidence 
are substantive law.’)”). 
129. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.200 (2008). 
130. S. 6363 § 4, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008); H.R. 2622 § 4, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. 
Sess. (Wash. 2008). 
131. Representatives of the Board of Judicial Administration and the Washington State Bar 
Association testified in opposition to the bill. Substitute S. 6933 Senate Bill Report, at 3 (2008); 
Substitute S. 6933 House Bill Report, at 5 (2008). For a description of the court’s rulemaking 
process see supra note 60. 
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through the court’s rulemaking process.132 
Chief Justice Alexander concluded, “While consideration of this issue 
may be appropriately before the state legislature, it is our view that the 
proponents of this legislation should first attempt to work through the 
rulemaking process pursuant to General Rule 9.”133 
Comments by members of the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees demonstrate that they were also concerned about intruding 
upon the power of the judiciary. House Judiciary Committee 
Chairwoman Pat Lantz expressed concern about “stepping on what 
clearly has been for the most part a court function to develop rules.”134 
Senator Chris Marr, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee and a 
bill sponsor,135 told the House Judiciary Committee that the final bill 
reflected the intent to ensure the legislation did not “unintentionally 
diminish the court’s rule-making authority.”136 
Senator Marr was referring to differences between the draft bills and 
final bill. While the draft bills included broad assertions of legislative 
authority over “substantive rules of evidence” and amendments to RCW 
2.04.200,137 the session law contains a brief statement of legislative and 
judicial authority over evidence rules: “the legislature and the courts 
share the responsibility for enacting rules of evidence.”138 
In sum, RCW 10.58.090 applies to evidence of other sex offenses 
                                                     
132. Letter from Chief Justice Gerry Alexander to Sen. Adam Kline, re: SB 6933–Changing rules 
concerning the admissibility of evidence in sex offense cases (Feb. 7, 2008) (included in Senate Bill 
file). 
133. Id. 
134. Executive Session on S. 6933, H. Judiciary Comm., 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Feb. 28, 
2008) (statement of Rep. Pat Lantz in support of amendment 6933-S AMH JUDI ZARO 021), 
available at 
http://www.tvw.org/media/mediaplayer.cfm?evid=2008021272&TYPE=V&CFID=1185621&CFT
OKEN=93536292&bhcp=1 at 1:07:00. 
135. Senator Marr sponsored both the Senate draft bill and the final bill. S. 6363 60th Leg., 2008 
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008); S. 6933, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008) (First Reading Feb. 7, 
2008). 
136. Hearing on S. 6933 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Feb. 27, 
2008) (statement of Sen. Chris Marr in support of S. 6933), available at 
http://www.tvw.org/media/mediaplayer.cfm?evid=2008021234&TYPE=V&CFID=1185621&CFT
OKEN=93536292&bhcp=1 at 1:04:25. 
137. See supra notes 125–130 and accompanying text. 
138. Sex Offenses—Admissibility of Evidence, ch. 90, § 1, 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 412 (“In 
Washington, the legislature and the courts share the responsibility for enacting the rules of 
evidence. . . . [t]he legislature’s authority for enacting rules of evidence arises from the Washington 
supreme court’s prior classification of such rules as substantive law.”). 
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offered in a wide range of sex-offense prosecutions.139 Under the statute, 
relevant evidence of other sex offenses is admissible, as long as it passes 
the balancing test under Rule 403.140 The statute’s express reference to 
Rule 403 differentiates RCW 10.58.090 from Federal Rules of Evidence 
413 and 414.141 The legislative history of the statute also demonstrates 
the drafters’ movement away from the federal rules and the cases 
construing them.142 Those cases provide for the introduction of evidence 
of other offenses upon the trial court’s conclusion that a reasonable 
finder-of-fact could conclude that the other offenses occurred143 and 
have applied a “toothless” version of Rule 403.144 The legislative history 
of the statute also demonstrates the legislature’s awareness of the 
separation-of-powers concerns that its enactment of the statute raises.145 
V. WASHINGTON COURTS HAVE DEVELOPED A NUANCED 
BODY OF LAW UNDER RULE 404(b) GOVERNING 
EVIDENCE OF OTHER SEX OFFENSES 
The Washington State Supreme Court has developed a considerable 
body of case law dealing with extraneous sex-offense evidence in sex-
offense prosecutions under Rule 404(b). The Court set out a four-part 
test for admission of evidence of other sex offenses in State v. Lough: 
To admit evidence of other crimes or wrongs under Washington 
law, the trial court must (1) identify the purpose for which the 
evidence is sought to be introduced, (2) determine whether the 
evidence is relevant to prove an element of the crime charged 
and (3) weigh the probative value of the evidence against its 
prejudicial effect. Additionally, the party offering the evidence 
of prior misconduct has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct actually 
occurred.146 
                                                     
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.58.090 (2008); see supra notes 90–108 and accompanying text. 
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.58.090 (2008); see supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
141. FED. R. EVID. 413; id. 414; see supra notes 36 & 89 and accompanying text. 
142. See supra notes 118–124 and accompanying text. 
143. United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998); see supra notes 33–35 and 
accompanying text. 
144. Orenstein, supra note 41, at 1491; see supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
145. See supra Part III (discussing the unresolved question of whether Washington’s legislature 
or judiciary has ultimate authority over the rules of evidence); supra Part IV.B (describing the 
legislature’s move toward more moderate assertions of authority over the rules of evidence). 
146. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d at 853, 889 P.2d at 490 (internal citations omitted). 
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The requirement that the prosecution demonstrate by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant actually committed the other offense 
before evidence of that offense is allowed before a finder of fact is well 
established in Washington.147 If this requirement is met, then a trial court 
will identify the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. If the 
evidence is relevant for that purpose, the trial court will conduct Rule 
403 balancing on the record.148 Under Rule 403, the trial court will admit 
relevant evidence of another offense unless its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.149 
Washington courts have admitted evidence of other sex offenses in 
sex-offense prosecutions for three purposes: (1) to prove that it was the 
defendant who attacked the victim; (2) to prove that the assault on the 
complaining victim actually occurred;150 and (3) to refute a defense of 
accident or mistake. These categories are based on Rule 404(b) 
exceptions for identity, common scheme or plan, and absence of 
mistake, respectively.151 
A. Washington Courts Evaluate Evidence of Another Sex Offense 
Offered to Prove Identity Under the Modus Operandi Exception 
When evidence of other sex offenses or sexual conduct is offered to 
prove identity, Washington courts consider it under the modus operandi 
exception.152 Evidence of other sex offenses is admissible under this 
exception if the way the other sex offense was committed is unique and 
very similar to the way the crime charged was committed.153 State v. 
Coe154 illustrates both requirements. In Coe, the Washington State 
                                                     
147. See, e.g., State v. Foxhoven, 161 Wash. 2d 168, 175, 163 P.3d 786, 789–90 (2007); State v. 
Thang, 145 Wash. 2d 630, 642, 41 P.3d 1159, 1165 (2002); State v. Norlin, 134 Wash. 2d 570, 577, 
951 P.2d 1131, 1134 (1998); State v. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d 631, 653, 845 P.2d 289, 302 (1993). This 
is in contrast to the federal practice, where extraneous offense evidence is evaluated under Rule 
104(b). See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
148. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 113 Wash. 2d 520, 526–27, 782 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1989). 
149. See WASH. R. EVID. 403. 
150. This purpose includes refuting a defense of consent in rape prosecutions. For example in 
Lough, 125 Wash. 2d 847, 889 P.2d 487, the defendant’s defense at trial was that he had not 
drugged the complaining victim in this case and that they had consensual sex. The Washington State 
Supreme Court affirmed the admission of testimony by other women to similar conduct under the 
common scheme or plan exception to Rule 404. 
151. See WASH. R. EVID. 404(b). 
152. State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 772, 777, 684 P.2d 668, 672 (1984). 
153. Id. at 777–79, 684 P.2d at 672–73. 
154. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 772, 684 P.2d 668. 
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Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s conviction for four forcible 
rapes, finding that one witness’s testimony failed the uniqueness 
requirement, and another witness’s testimony failed the similarity 
requirement.155 
Coe’s former girlfriend had testified at trial about aspects of their 
consensual sexual relationship.156 The court ruled that it was error to 
admit her testimony because while the behavior she described was 
similar to the behavior described by the rape victims, it was not 
unique.157 The court also “question[ed] the relevancy of an individual’s 
behavior in a consensual sexual relationship to demonstrate modus 
operandi with respect to a violent nonconsensual sexual act.”158 
The court concluded that the trial court also erred by admitting the 
testimony of a woman who alleged that Coe had approached her on a 
jogging trail, “fondling what appeared to be a replica of a penis” and 
making sexually explicit comments.159 The court said that though the 
jogger had described unusual behavior, the evidence was nonetheless 
inadmissible because the behavior was “not similar to the actions of the 
rapist.”160 
B.  Washington Courts Evaluate Evidence of Other Offenses Offered 
to Prove That the Charged Crime Occurred Under the Common 
Scheme or Plan Exception 
Washington courts also allow evidence of other sex offenses for the 
purpose of proving that the charged crime occurred as the victim 
described it under the common scheme or plan exception. In State v. 
Lough, the trial court admitted the testimony of four women who all said 
that Lough, a paramedic, had drugged and raped them while they were in 
a relationship with him.161 The account of the victim of the charged 
crime was substantially the same.162 After a comprehensive review of the 
                                                     
155. Id. at 776–79, 684 P.2d at 671–73. 
156. Id. at 776, 684 P.2d at 671 (“For example, she testified Coe indicated he liked to masturbate, 
and that he used certain vulgar terms while they were engaged in sexual activity. She also declared 
Coe would frequently perform cunnilingus on her and that he would fondle his penis and insert his 
fingers in her vagina prior to having sexual intercourse.”). 
157. Id. at 778, 684 P.2d at 672. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 778–79, 684 P.2d at 672–73. 
160. Id. There was no testimony or other evidence that the attacker had a replica penis. 
161. State v. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d 847, 850–51, 889 P.2d 487, 489 (1995). 
162. Id. at 849, 889 P.2d at 488. 
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victim’s testimony and that of the four prior victims, revealing the 
marked similarity between them, the court concluded, “A rational trier of 
fact could find that the Defendant was the mastermind of an overarching 
plan.”163 
In State v. DeVincentis,164 the court distinguished the common 
scheme or plan exception from the modus operandi exception. The court 
said that when the issue in the case is whether the crime occurred (as 
opposed to the identity of the perpetrator), factual similarity between 
evidence of other offenses and the charged crime is required but 
uniqueness is not.165 The defendant, DeVincentis, paid his twelve-year-
old neighbor K.S. and her friend to mow his lawn and then to clean his 
house.166 After the girls cleaned the house together once, DeVincentis 
asked K.S. to clean alone.167 While she worked, DeVincentis wore only 
g-string or bikini underwear, and said something to the effect of “I hope 
you don’t mind.”168 He eventually asked her to massage his back while 
he wore only the g-string or bikini underwear.169 He later removed his 
underwear and asked her to massage his buttocks and legs, then told her 
to lie down and massaged her back, buttocks and legs.170 Finally, he laid 
on his back and told K.S. to massage his stomach and penis, until he 
ejaculated.171 
The trial court admitted evidence that DeVincentis had been 
convicted fifteen years earlier in New York for having molested a ten-
year-old friend of his daughter.172 V.C., the victim of the earlier abuse, 
testified that she frequently spent time at his home,173 and that he often 
wore nothing but bikini or g-string underwear.174 She testified that she 
                                                     
163. Id. at 861, 889 P.2d at 495. 
164. 150 Wash. 2d 11, 74 P.3d 119 (2003). 
165. Id. at 21, 74 P.3d at 125 (“Evidence of unique modus operandi is relevant when the focus of 
the inquiry is the identity of the perpetrator, not whether the charged crime occurred. As we have 
recently established, when identity is at issue, the degree of similarity must be at the highest level 
and the commonalities must be unique because the crimes must have been committed in a manner to 
serve as an identifiable signature.”) (internal citation omitted). 
166. Id. at 13, 74 P.3d at 121. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 14, 74 P.3d at 121. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 15, 74 P.3d at 122. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
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had “memory flashes” of abusive encounters that began with massages 
and progressed to his ejaculating on her.175 
The Washington State Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s 
determination that V.C.’s testimony was sufficiently factually similar to 
the testimony of the complaining victim to be admitted for the purpose 
of proving that the charged crime occurred. The court quoted extensively 
from the trial court’s oral ruling admitting the testimony of V.C.: 
The trial court explained that “the evidence involving [V.C.] is 
relevant to show that the defendant had devised a scheme to get 
to know young people through a safe channel, such as a friend 
of his daughter, or . . . as a friend of the next-door neighbor 
girl . . . .” . . . This plan allowed DeVincentis to bring the 
children into “an apparently safe but actually unsafe and isolated 
environment so that he could pursue his compulsion to have 
sexual contact with these . . . prepubescent or pubescent 
girls.” . . .  Other similarities that the trial court noted included 
walking around his house in an unusual piece of clothing—
bikini or g-string underwear . . . . With both girls, DeVincentis 
“asked for a massage or gave [a] massage, asked or directed the 
child to a secluded spot such as a bedroom, directed or asked 
that clothes be taken off . . . .” Finally, in both instances, he had 
the girls masturbate him until climax.176 
The court stated that while “unique or uncommon” facts were not 
required, “[r]andom similarities are not enough.”177 Referring to the 
similarities in the testimony of K.S. and V.C., the court found that 
DeVincentis first gained the trust of both girls, then desensitized them to 
his nudity, “thereby making it easier to move from nudity to physical 
skin-to-skin touch and sexual behavior.”178 The supreme court’s 
emphasis on the facts of the case demonstrates the kind of factual 
similarity courts looked for before between the charged crime and 
evidence of another offense, when determining whether such evidence is 
admissible under Rule 404(b). 
                                                     
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 22, 74 P.3d at 125–26 (internal citations omitted). 
177. Id. at 18–19, 74 P.3d at 124. 
178. Id. at 16, 74 P.3d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). 
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C.  Washington Courts Also Look for Factual Similarity Before 
Admitting Evidence of Other Offenses to Rebut a Defense of 
Mistake or Accident 
Evidence that the defendant has committed another offense may be 
admissible to refute the defendant’s assertions that either the defendant’s 
own conduct was a mistake or accident, or that the victim mistook the 
defendant’s innocent behavior for criminal conduct.179 For example, in 
State v. Baker,180 the defendant was accused of touching the genitals of 
his girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter, N.H., while the child was 
asleep.181 He claimed that if he had touched the girl, it was an accident 
because he was asleep himself.182 In part to refute that defense, the 
prosecution offered testimony by Baker’s own daughter that he had 
molested her during her childhood while she was sleeping.183 The court 
of appeals affirmed, finding that the alleged other acts were similar 
enough to the crime charged to be admitted to refute Baker’s defense 
that any touching had been an accident.184 
VI. UNDER RCW 10.58.090, TRIAL COURTS RETAIN A KEY 
GATE-KEEPING ROLE WHEN EVIDENCE OF OTHER SEX 
OFFENSES IS OFFERED 
Washington courts should interpret RCW 10.58.090 in a manner that 
preserves the trial court’s important gate-keeping function. When 
balancing the probative value and potential for unfair prejudice under the 
new statute, Washington courts should use the well-developed body of 
case law governing evidence of other sex offenses under Rule 404(b) as 
a guide. This approach is consistent with the legislature’s judgment that 
evidence of other sex offenses is different from evidence that a 
defendant has committed other types of offenses, protects the accuracy 
of trials, and avoids difficult separation-of-powers questions about 
authority over evidence law. 
                                                     
179. WASH. R. EVID. 404(b). 
180. 89 Wash. App. 726, 950 P.2d 486 (1997). 
181. Id. at 729, 950 P.2d at 488. 
182. Id. at 731, 950 P.2d at 489. 
183. Id. at 730, 950 P.2d at 488. 
184. Id. at 734–35, 950 P.2d at 491. The appellate court also found the testimony admissible for 
the purpose of establishing a common scheme or plan. Id. 
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A.  Robust Rule 403 Balancing is Consistent with the Text and 
Legislative History of RCW 10.58.090 
Nothing in the text or the legislative history of RCW 10.58.090 
suggests that the Rule 403 balancing test should be watered down in 
favor of admissibility. In fact, the statute’s emphasis on Rule 403, and 
the revisions of and amendments to the statute’s text,185 suggests the 
opposite. When the legislature passed RCW 10.58.090, Federal Rules 
413 and 414 had been in effect for thirteen years and had generated 
substantial case law.186 While many of Washington’s evidence rules 
closely track the federal rules,187 RCW 10.58.090 contains substantial 
textual differences. Whereas Federal Rules 413 and 414 do not mention 
Rule 403 balancing and say that sex-offense evidence “may be 
considered for its bearing on any matter for which it is relevant,” the 
Washington statute explicitly states that courts should evaluate such 
evidence under Rule 403 and includes the text of Rule 403 the statute.188 
The Washington State Legislature declined to adopt the language of 
the federal rules, and removed all references to Federal Rules 413 and 
414 and the cases construing them, which limits the persuasive force of 
those Rules and cases.189 The federal appellate courts have limited the 
effectiveness of Rule 403 balancing when it is applied to evidence of 
other sex offenses under Rules 413 and 414.190 Scholars have criticized 
the ineffective application of Rule 403 in federal courts. According to 
Professor Aviva Orenstein, “the [federal] courts have weakened Rule 
403 by tending to admit evidence of prior sexual offenses automatically 
under a pro forma approach to Rule 403.”191 Professor Rosanna 
                                                     
185. See supra Part IV.A. 
186. See supra Part II. 
187. Washington has adopted twenty-two evidence rules that are textually identical to the federal 
rules, and five that are substantively identical. It has also adopted twenty-one hearsay exceptions 
that are identical to those included under Federal Rule 803. WEINSTEIN, supra note 16, Table of 
State and Military Adaptations of Federal Rules of Evidence, T-1–T-182. 
188. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.58.090(6) (2008) (“When evaluating whether evidence of the 
defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses should be excluded pursuant to 
Evidence Rule 403, the trial judge shall consider . . . (g) Whether the probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”); 
see also supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
189. See supra Part IV.A and notes 37–40. 
190. See supra notes 36–43 and accompanying text. 
191. Orenstein, supra note 41, at 1520. 
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Cavallaro similarly writes, “only one [federal] court has recognized the 
inappropriateness of acquiescing . . . to a ‘diluted’ form of Rule 403 
review for similar acts evidence in sexual assault cases.”192 The plain 
text of Washington’s statute and its legislative history suggest that 
Washington courts should not follow the interpretation of the federal 
courts and should instead apply meaningful Rule 403 balancing to 
evidence of other sex offenses. 
B.  Washington’s Well-Developed Body of Case Law Governing 
Evidence of Other Sex Offenses Provides Guidelines to Ensure 
Meaningful Rule 403 Balancing 
Washington courts should retain the requirement that trial courts find 
that an extraneous sex offense occurred by a preponderance of the 
evidence under Rule 104(a) before admitting evidence of that offense.193 
This rule is well established in Washington and has previously been 
applied to evidence of other sex offenses.194 The text of RCW 10.58.090 
does not mention the standard courts should apply to preliminary 
determinations as to whether the other offense occurred,195 and there is 
no reason to change this established practice.196 
Rule 403 requires the trial court to weigh evidence’s probative value 
against the danger of unfair prejudice.197 Rule 403 implicitly requires a 
court to find that proffered evidence is relevant under Rule 401 because 
evidence that is not relevant has no probative value. Under Rule 401, 
evidence is relevant when it has “any tendency” to make a material fact 
more or less probable;198 therefore, a trial court must identify the specific 
purpose for which evidence is offered before it can meaningfully assess 
the evidence’s relevance or probative value. 
In sex-offense prosecutions, evidence of another sex offense is often 
offered to prove that it was the defendant who attacked the victim, to 
                                                     
192. Cavallaro, supra note 42, at 69. 
193. See supra notes 146–147 and accompanying text. 
194. Id. 
195. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.58.090 (2008). 
196. In light of the textual differences between RCW 10.58.090 and Federal Rules 413 and 414, 
see supra Part VI.A, the fact that federal courts apply the Rule 104(b) standard, see supra notes 33–
35 and accompanying text, is not a persuasive reason for Washington courts to adopt Rule 104(b). 
197. WASH. R. EVID. 403. 
198. Id. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.”). 
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prove that the charged crime occurred, or to refute a defense of accident 
or mistake. These categories are based on exceptions to Rule 404(b).199 
While these categories are not necessarily exclusive, they capture the 
most common uses for evidence of other sex offenses and therefore 
remain useful in assessing the probative worth of such evidence, despite 
RCW 10.58.090’s rejection of Rule 404(b) in general. 
The principles that emerge from DeVincentis, Baker, and Coe are 
useful guides to trial courts performing Rule 403 balancing under the 
statute. Evidence that a defendant has committed another sex offense is 
“likely to be highly prejudicial.”200 In light of the likelihood that 
evidence of other sex offenses will result in substantial unfair prejudice 
to the defendant, such evidence should only be admitted under Rule 403 
if it also has significant probative value. The first factor that RCW 
10.58.090 instructs trial courts to consider when performing Rule 403 
balancing is “[t]he similarity of the prior acts to the acts charged.”201 
This factor emphasizes the importance of factual similarity between the 
evidence of another offense and the crime charged. Existing Washington 
case law can be used to give this requirement meaning. 
Under the principles established in Coe, evidence of other sex 
offenses that is offered to prove identity is probative when it is both 
factually similar to the charged crime and describes an unusual or unique 
way of committing the crime.202 The need for other sex-offense evidence 
to prove identity arises when a complaining victim is unable to identify 
the attacker and there is also little or no physical evidence available for 
that purpose. In such cases, the defendant is not disputing that the victim 
was attacked, but rather is asserting that the defendant was not the 
attacker. Evidence that the defendant has committed another sex offense 
that is either non-distinctive or factually dissimilar from the assault the 
complaining victim describes, is not particularly probative of identity.203 
Admitting dissimilar or non-distinctive other offense evidence for the 
purpose of proving identity invites the jury to convict the defendant 
because the defendant has done something reprehensible in the past, 
even if it is not the crime charged, or because the jury has determined 
that the defendant is a sexual predator and therefore must have 
                                                     
199. See supra note 151. 
200. State v. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d 847, 862, 889 P.2d 487, 495 (1995). See also supra Part I. 
201. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.58.090(6)(a) (2008). 
202. See supra Part V.A. 
203. See State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 772, 777–79, 684 P.2d 668, 672 (1984). 
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committed the crime charged. 
Under the principles established in DeVincentis and Baker, evidence 
of other offenses offered to prove that the crime charged occurred or to 
refute a defense of accident or mistake may have significant probative 
value when there is a high degree of factual similarity to the crime 
charged.204 The need for evidence of other offenses arises when the 
defendant asserts that the alleged victim has fabricated the assault, 
consented to sexual conduct, or has mistaken innocent conduct for an 
assault. The evidence of another sex offense is then relevant and 
probative because when another victim describes substantially similar 
conduct, the complaining victim’s account becomes more credible.205 
When evidence of another sex offense is offered for this purpose, courts 
should consider whether the kinds of factual similarity identified in 
DeVincentis exist; this evaluation includes the similarity in the ages of 
the victims and of the conduct described, including the sexual conduct 
and other conduct leading to it.206 If the evidence of another offense is 
linked by only “random similarities,”207 to the crime charged, its 
probative value is likely to be outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice 
to the defendant. 
C.  Preserving the Trial Court’s Gate-Keeping Role Also Avoids a 
Potential Conflict Between the Legislature and the Court Over the 
Power to Enact Evidence Rules 
The question of whether the legislature or the judiciary has ultimate 
authority over the rules of evidence in Washington is unresolved.208 
However, precedent suggests that evidentiary rules are an area where the 
court will assert its power as against that of the legislature.209 The 
legislative history of RCW 10.58.090 suggests that the legislature was 
aware of this potential conflict and amended the statute to moderate its 
assertions of power over evidence rules.210 
                                                     
204. See supra Parts V.B–C. 
205. Professor Imwinkelreid describes this use of evidence that the defendant has committed 
another sex offense as an application of the doctrine of chances. See Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 
1135. 
206. See supra notes 168–175 and accompanying text. 
207. State v. DeVincentis, 150 Wash. 2d 11, 18, 74 P.3d 119, 124 (2003). 
208. See supra Part III. 
209. See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text. 
210. See supra Part IV.B. 
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Institutional competence concerns lie behind the question of whether 
the legislature or the courts have ultimate authority over the rules of 
evidence. Analysis of admissibility of evidence generally begins with 
whether the proffered evidence is relevant, probative, and not unduly 
prejudicial. These are highly fact-specific inquiries that have 
traditionally been left to trial judges.211 
An evidentiary statute construed as a legislative determination that 
entire category of evidence “is admissible[] notwithstanding”212 the 
traditional bar on other offense evidence has the potential to undermine 
the judiciary’s traditional gate-keeping role. The sheer number of 
offenses included in RCW 10.58.090 and differences between the 
elements of many of them213 heighten this concern. This, in turn, raises 
questions as to whether individual defendants will be tried “upon 
competent evidence, and only for the offence charged.”214 Interpreting 
RCW 10.58.090 to demand meaningful Rule 403 analysis of such 
evidence gives effect to the purpose of the statute by moving analysis of 
the admissibility of evidence of other offenses out of Rule 404 and into 
Rule 403, while preserving the judiciary’s gate-keeping role. 
CONCLUSION 
Washington’s new sex-offense evidence statute, RCW 10.58.090, 
should be interpreted by Washington courts to require standards-based 
Rule 403 balancing before evidence of other sex offenses is admitted. 
Precedent applying Rule 404(b) provides meaningful standards. Using 
those standards to guide admissibility under RCW 10.58.090 gives effect 
to the legislature’s judgment that sex-offense evidence is different from 
other evidence, without undermining the traditional gate-keeping role of 
the trial court. It also avoids a potential conflict between the legislature 
and judiciary over evidence rule-making authority. 
 
                                                     
211. Cavallaro, supra note 42, at 38 (citing Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of 
[Evidence] Rulemaking,” 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 882–83 (2002)). 
212. RCW 10.58.090(1) broadly states that “evidence of the defendant’s commission of another 
sex offense or sex offenses is admissible, notwithstanding Evidence Rule 404(b).” WASH. REV. 
CODE § 10.58.090(1) (2008). 
213. See supra notes 90–108 and accompanying text. For example, the statute would potentially 
make offenses such as voyeurism or possession of child pornography admissible in a prosecution 
for a violent sexual assault, despite significant differences in the elements of the offenses. 
214. Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 458 (1892). 
